No neutrality principles emerge when ordinary investment income is taxed at the same rate as capital gains income.
Introduction
This paper examines the effects of a simple capital gains tax in an economy with an Austrian sector and an ordinary sector. In the ordinary sector the investment process is simple and straightforward; an investment of a dollar produces a stream of returns in the future. Assets in the Austrian sector do not yield a stream of services. They increase in value as they age; when they are harvested this growth stops. The standard examples of Austrian investments are wine and trees, and we shall use these terms to refer to two different kinds of Austrian assets. Trees are assets which require scarce resources --i.e., ones which earn rents --while they age. In considering when to cut down a tree it is important to take account of the fact that the land on which a tree now stands can be used to grow another tree once its present occupant is felled.
Wine, in distinction, uses no scarce resources as it matures; the casks and cellars in which wine ages earn no rents.
We focus on the effects of capital gains taxation on Austrian investments for two reasons. First, the effects are simple and straightforward.
We are able to obtain exact expressions for the effect of capital gains taxes on the allocatjTon of investment between sectors and for the efficiency of resource use within the Austrian sector. We extend some of this analysis to the case where the death of the investor (which has significant tax consequences in the U.S.) is uncertain.1
In an earlier version of this paper, we also considered the effect of uncertainty about the growth of Austrian assets; since the main conclusion of that exercise was that considering uncertainty did not change the character of our results, we have drop?ed it from our paper.
Secondly, a capital gains tax affects the timing of transactionS.
With Austrian assets these effects have real, easily-understood consequences. Most previous studies, empirical and theoretical,2 have, implicitly or explicitly, focused on the effect of capital gains taxation on purely financial assets.
It seems clear from first principles that capital gains taxes should, at least in an inflationary world, operate as a kind of turnover tax, inhibiting the sale of stocks and bonds which show gains and encouraging the sale of assets on which losses have been incurred. Constantinides (1980) and Constantinides and Scholes (1980) have shown just how appealing the strategy of realizing losses and never selling gains can be when well-organized futures markets with low transactions costs exist. Feldstein, Sleinrod, and Yitzhaki (1980) , Feldstein and Slemrod ( 1978) , and Feldstein and Yitzhaki (1978) have presented evidence that this theory is correct --that the capital gains tax does indeed inhibit the sale of assets whose prices have increased since they were purchased. It is not clear, at least to us, what the real effect of such an inhibition is. In general, sales of stock are purely financial transactions and do not lead to investment or disinvestment of real assets. ile it seems quite likely that the volume of transactions has some effect on the efficiency of the allocation of investment, to our kno1edge, no one has framed a theory which will allow us to deLer the preferred volume of transactions.
Without such a theory one cannot say whether discouraging transactions is good or bad.
2Lippn and McCall (1980) is a significant e:ception.
Our analysis assumes that capitaa gains taxes fall only on Austrian assets. Thus we can only analyze the effect of the capital gains tax on Austrian assets. The ordinary sector is in our model for two reasons;
first, we assume that it is sufficiently large that the after-tax rate of return --which in our simple model is the social discount rate --is determined outside of the Austrian sector and is independent of the rate and form of the capital gains tax. Secondly, having an ordinary sector allows us to examine the effect of capital gains taxation on the allocation of resources between Austrian and other investments.
We summarize our results as follQws. Section I sets out the basic model and analyzes the effects of capital gains taxation on Austrian investments.
Our partial equilibrium model assumes that the total amount of investment is fixed. Taxation, in particular the capital gains tax, can affect economic efficiency in two quite different ways. First taxes can affect the flow of investment between sectors. The intersectoral allocation of investment is efficient when the present discounted value of all returns --public and private --from a dollar of investment is the same in all sectors. We find that when income in the ordinary sector is taxed at rate and capital gains in the Austrian sector are taxed at rate T, this equality is unlikely to hold, even if T = T In particular, when tax rates in the sectors are equal, 0
Austrian investments have lower total returns than ordinary investments.
While not without interest, this cornparison is quite artificial. A major accomplishment of recent research on the ta::ation of capital has been the demonstration that T is an axtraordinarilv conplicated beast.
-
As the endproduct of the complex interaction of nan provisions of the tax law, cannot be identified with anything so sn-1e as the corporate income tax. ThuE it is hard to conceive of a realistic tax change which could set T = T. 0
Another effect of capital gains taxation is on the allocation of resources within a sector. For Austrian investments, the resource whose use can be varied is time; we find that the capital gains tax leads to inefficiencies within the wine sector by encouraging wine to be sold more quickly than it would be in the absence of taxation. This does not hold for some tree investments. If investment opportunities are stationary, and if there is no inflation, cutting time is independent of T and capital gains taxation introduces no distortions. If conditions are not stationary, or if there is inflation, taxes affect cutting time in a complicated way.
These results were obtained for taxation on a realization basis.
Accrual taxation introduces different distortions. When T T total 0 returns from Austrian investments (both wine and trees) can be greater or less than returns from ordinary investments. For a given rate of taxation, selling time (again for wine and trees) is less under accrual taxation than under realization taxation. We have made comparisons of taxation at equal rates rather than equal yields because such comparisons are simpler.
However, as Stiglitz (1981) has shown, the problem of calculating the effective yield of a capital gains tax is sufficiently complex that it seems no good case can be made for the proposition that comparisons of taxes which have equal yields are more meaningful than comparisons of taxes which have equal rates.
Our model produces no strong a priori case for the greater efficiency of accrual taxation. Our examination of the effects of inflation in Section II strengthens the case for realization as opposed to accrual taxation. Although there are exceptions, on balance inflation (at least rapid inflation) tends to alleviate the distortions caused by taxation on a realization basis while it complicates, sometimes exacerbating and sometimes alleviating the distortions caused by accrual taxation.
In Section III we show how the analysis is changed by taking account of the special ways in which capital gains are, or could be taxed, at death. We show how the present United States tax system, which allows automatic step up of basis at death, encourages' people to hold on to assets longer than they would otherwise. Since the tax system leads them to sell wine sooner than they should, at least for wine this corrects (and possibly overcorrects) a distortion of the tax system.
Much previous work on capital gains taxation has focused on the way in which capital gains taxes tend to inhibit transactions and to encourage investors to hold assets --at least assets which are growing in value --longer than they otherwise would. Our analysis suggests that the effects are diverse and complicated. The results suiamarized above showed that the capital gains tax could sometimes shorten, sometimes lengthen, and sometimes leave unchanged the length of time the owner of an Austrian asset would wait before he harvested it. However, we did obtain one result which shows that the capital gains tax discourages transactions in Austrian assets. In Proposition 3 below we show that the owner of an Austrian asset who is subject to capital gains taxation on a realization basis will never sell it to another interediate producer. He will always nake higher profits by holding on to wine until it is sold to the consicaer. Although Proposition 3 is stated for wine, it also clearly holds for trees. Thus the capital gains tax acts as a kind of tu:ncver or transaction tax on Austrian assets and as such prornotes vertical integration in industries which use ,ustrian processes.
We have sacrificed a great deal of reality to keep our models simple and tractable. The capital gains tax is proportional and everyone pays the same rate. We ignore the complexities and arbitrage opportunities which are encouraged by progressive taxatian at different rates.3
We also ignore the arbitrage opportunities which the options market permits. Constantinides (1980) and Constantinide-s and Scholes (1980) have argued th.at by using the options imarket, investors can avoid ever realizing capital gains. Sales of assets (which are taxable events) are dominated by the purchase and sale of options (based on the asset's future value) which can be written in such a way that taxes are avoided or deferred. This argent loses some of its force in an Austrian model.
Assets must be sold eventually or the tree rots or the wine goes bad.
Row the existence of an active options market would affect our results
is an interesting question which we have not examined.
We have also assumed that investors have a very simple goal. They maximize the present discounted value of wealth. We assume a constant discount rate of r. When we treat uncertainty we assume that investors are risk neutral so that they maximize the expected present discounted vue of wealth. Thus we ignore both risk aversion and portfolio effects.
We make this choice for two reasons. First, it's what we can do. Second, while it is not fol1y difficult to introduce risk aversion into me 3 Lippman and 1cCal1 (1980) We assume that investors place the same value on wealth which their heirs realize as on the wealth they receive if they harvest an asset. where is the tax rate in the ordinary sector. The tax rate cannot be identified with any single parameter of the tax code such as the corporate profits tax. Auerbach (1979) and others have analyzed the complex ways in which the provisions of the tax la combine to produce
If the stream of returns is not constant, -r0 is even more complicated.
1. The After Tax Rate of Return.
We define the after tax rate of return r as the solution to -rs
1= fy(l-T)e ds. formulae for valuing dollars of investment. Our concern in this paper is with valuing investments in different sectors and it does not seem worthwhile to follow this line of analysis, at laast in part because to follow it we would need to assume that the allocation of investment between sectors was also fixed mechanically. Another way of aking the same point is to say that we are assuming that the total an:nt cf investment is fixed. Given this we examine the efficiency of the allocstfon of resources to investment, both within and between sectors.
B. Austrian Sectors
In the economy there are also Anstrn n.'estnent opportunities.
Austrian investments are point input1 tsfnt
prs. An investment at an initial time to produces an asset which has a value of X(t -t) if the asset is harvested and used for consumption at time t.
1. Wine and Trees.
We consider two kinds of Austrian production processes. In the first, and simpler, an initial investment produces an asset which increases in value as it ages. We call the output of this process wine. The other Austrian output, a tree, is distinguished from wine by the fact that it uses a scarce resource, land, as it ages. When a tree is felled, another can be planted in its place. When iine is drunk, the bottle in which it has matured is discarded. We need terms to describe the time when an Austrian asset's maturation is terminated and it is consumed. For trees "cutting time" seems appropriate. For wine we shall call this time "selling time." This usage is justified in Proposition 3, below where it is shown that the capital gains tax discourages transfers of wine before it is consumed. Since the argument of Proposition 3 can be adapted to trees, we shall also occasionally use selling time to refer to trees and wine together.
Values and Rates of Return Without Taxes.
Suppose that there are no taxes in the Austrian sector. In equilibrium assets invested in the Austrian sector must earn a rate of return equal to r. If they ear-ri a rate of return greater than r, the value of resources used to produce wine will be bid up until the rate of return is just r. If B is the value or price of resources used to produce wine which has a value of X(t) when sold or harvested after t years, -rt B = max e x(t).
We will define t as the solution to this maximization problem.
In equilibrium, scarce resources in the other Austrian sector (trees) also earn the competitive rate of return, but since the scarce resource, land, is not used to produce trees but to provide a place for them to mature, the analysis is slightly different.
If trees can be planted at cost F, the present discounted value of a plot of land which can support one tree forever is, if trees are harvested at intervals of length u, and if the value of a tree of age u is
The optimal cutting period u is chosen to maximize L(u); if used in the Austrian sector this plot of land has a value of L(u). If used in the ordinary sector it has an alternative value, say L. It is used in the Sector in which it has the higher value.
C.
Capital Gains Taxes, Realization.
In this section we analyze the effects of capital gains taxes which are levied on a realization basis. In the next section we analyze the effects of capital gains taxes levied on a accrual basis.
Wine.
Consider an investment in vine which if harvested and sold at time t, will yield X(t). If the wine initially costs B, capital gains are [X(t) -B). If capital gains are taxed when realized at rate T net proceeds
The cutting time is chosen to maximize the present discounted value of these net proceeds. In equilibrium investments earn the competitive rate of return so that B satisfies.
where the selling time t maximizes the present discounted value of the investor's after tax profits. In interpreting (3) it should be kept in mind that r, T and X( ) are parameters while B and t are chosen to satisfy (3).
If r and XC ) are held constant B and t are functions of T. B is the value of the investment opportunity represented by X( ). If the real cost of the resources used to produce X( ) cost less than B then these resources will be used to produce wine; conpetition will cause the value of these resources to rise to B. If they coEt nore than B, the wine which has the value stream x( ) will not be produced.
The present disconte value of the total returns to an investment of _rt* B dollars in wine is X(t)e . We can rewrite (3) to see that A dollar invested in the ordinary sector produces returns with a total discounted value of (l-T0). The reason why these formulae differ is easy to understand. Considered solely in terms of costs and returns on investment ine is like an ordinary investment which requires an initial investment of B and returns X(t), t periods later when it is sold• If it were taxed as an ordinary investment, the tax base would be X(t), tax revenues would be TX(t) and the total return from a dollar's worth of invest--1 ment would be (l-T) . Since investments in wine are taxed as capital gains the tax base is not X(t) but X(t) -B. We summarize this discussion in Proposition 1: The present discounted value of total returns from a dollar invested in wine is less than the present discounted value of total returns from a dollar invested in the ordinary sector if and only if _rt* -1 (4)
There is a slight, and inessential, technical difference. In order to use continuous time we assume that returns from ordinary investments are flows while returns from Austrian investments are stocks.
1L4
If r -T, then returns to investments in the ordinary sector are greater than returns to investments in wine. If i > T , then returns to investments 0 in wine may or may not be greater than returns to ordinary investments.
Since different kinds of wines may have different selling times (different t*) it is quite possible that some wine investments may have greater and some lesser total social returns than ordinary investments. In interpreting the condition T < it is well to keep in mind what a complicated parameter
The value of B determines the allocation of resources to the wine sector. As B increases more resources are devoted to the production of wine. Whether or not this increases or decreases economic well-being depends on (4). In contrast, the parameter t determines the efficiency with which resources in the wine sector are used. The value of all resources devoted to wine grows according to the function X( ). Since the social discount rate is r, the wine should be allowed to mature until £ where £ maximizes.ertX(t). Assuming, as we shall, that x'(t)/X(t) is a decreasing function, £ is the unique solution to A A (5)
However, the selling time for wine, t*, is chosen to maximize private return not social return; t satisfies not (5) but (3), thus t must satisfy (6) X' (t*)/X(t*) = r(l + This establishes Proposftion2: t < t.
In interpreting this proposition it should be remembered that while each wine investment may have a different socially optimal selling time £ and a different privately optimal selling time t*, for all such investments the privately optimal time is too short. Were it to increase, the resources allocated to the wine sector would be used more efficiently and the present discounted value of the output of the wine sector would increase. Like proposition 1, proposition 2 is a consequence of the form of capital gains taxation. If wine were taxed as ordinary income the after tax return would be X(t)(l-T) and t*would be chosen to maximize (lT)X(t)e_'t so t would equal 1.
A high basis increases the value of an asset subject to capital gains taxation. it is conceivable that this effect could be strong enough to encourage turnover of assets like wine. Working against this is the fact that capital gains taxes are also turnover taxes and thus they inhibit transactions. We show in Proposition 3 that this latter effect dominates.
Proposition 3. No wine is sold before it is consumed.
Proof: Suppose first that the basis is 0. In this case the wine will be consumed at the same time as it would be were there no tax. The value of holding the wine to maturity is
If the person sells the asset iediately for a price S he will net, after taxes, only (l-)S. Thus he will be better off selling only if S(l-T) > (l-T)W°or if S > W°. oever, it is sy to see that no person facing the capital tax will pa;.' Dore than W0 to buy the asset. A prospective buyer is viliThz to pay only S where S is a solution to 
dBe <0 dT _rt*
-Te
2) To calculate dt*/dT we note that B is a function of T and that t maximizes F(t, T) = et (X(t )(1 -T) + TB(T)) so that t* must satisfy
Thus, a-= -i-and, since F11 < 0 by the second order conditions for 11 maximizing F with respect to t, it follows that sign dt*/dT = sign F12.
But using (3), (7) and (8) we have that rt * e Proposition 4 indicates that the effects of increasing the capital gains tax on economic efficiency are complex. If inequality (4) holds --as it will whenever I < --then increasing T improves efficiency by diverting funds from the vine sector into the ordinary sector (dB/dt < 0) the efficiency of the resources used in the wine sector will decrease as increasing taxes causes wine to be harvested sooner than it should be (dt*/dT < 0).
Trees.
The analysis for trees is much simpler. As Lippman and McCall (1980) have observed, the optimal cutting time u* is independent of the rate at which a proportional capital gains tax is levied. We model the elf ect of the capital gains tax by assuming the owner of a tree pays a tax on the increase in the tree's value from P, its initial cost, to V(u). Thus, assuming he plants another tree, his after tax cash flow at time u is
so that u is chosen to maximize
e -i it is worth noting that this does not hold for all tree investments;
it is a consequence of the assumption that invesent opportunities in the tree sector are stationary. If a plot of land will support a sequence of trees each associated. with a planting cost P. and a potential value stream VI, the sequence of cutting tznes {u) (u1, u2 ...) will be chosen to iiiaximize
The optimal sequence {u*} will be independent of T if and --for all practical purposes --only if P1 = P for all i. If the sequence of planting costs is not stationary T will affect the efficiency of resource use in the tree sector.
Proposition 6: If planting costs are constant,tlu*} = {uJ-.
The analysis of total return in the tree sector has elements of the analysis in the ordinary sector and of the analysis in the wine sector. To deal with the non-stationary case we analyze total returns from one cycle of investment. Total investment is land withdrawn from production for u periods and the planting cost P. Total after tax returns are (V(u) -P)(l-T) P Thus, we have, in equilibrium.
Solving for total return we obtain -ru L(u)(l-e1) + P Tprn
A dollar of investment thus brings total returns equal to
position 7. The present discounted value of total returns from a dollar invested in the tree sector is 16 where u is the cutting time of the tree and 6 is the ratio of planting Costs to total investment costs.
C. Accrual Taxation
It is sometimes asserted that many of the distortions and inefficiencies which the capital gains tax causes are due to the fact that capital gains are taxed on a realization basis; if taxation were on an accrual basis these distortions would disappear. We examine this claim by analyzing the effect of accrual taxation on the efficiency of allocation of resources between and within investment sectors. Our model does not support the proposition that accrual taxation is to be preferred on efficiency grounds.
Accrual taxation introduces distortions different from, and in some cases greater than, the distortions caused by realization taxation. While some parameter values may favor accrual taxation, one cannot make a strong apori case for it --at least using the model of this paper. If anything the evidence ses to run the other way. We observed above that in the stationary case taxation on a realization basis does not affect the cutting time of trees. We will see in Proposition 10 below that the cutting time of trees is a decreasing function of the rate of accrual taxation.
Wine
We begin our analysis by noting that the effect of accrual taxation on wine is to force investors to behave as if their discount rate were r/ (l-T) rather than r; furtheroore, trees taxed on an accrual basis will be cut down sooner than when taxed on a realization basis at the sane rate. If taxed on an accrual basis at rate T, wine with a growth path of X( ) will be harvested at time t where t satisfies Xt(t )/X(t ) = r/(l-T). Thea a a a present discounted value of such wine is X(ta) exp-(r/l-T) ta• Furthermore dt < 0 and t < t where t is the harvesting time when wine is taxed on a dT a realization basis at rate T.
Proof:
1) The key to the proof is our assumption that taxes are levied on increases in the market value of the wine. That is, if W(t) is the value of the wine at time t, increases in W(t) must satisfy 
W(t) = e_t[W(tLt)(l_T) + TW(t)J.
This formula assumes that the investor bought the tree for W(t) in period t and sold it for W(t+&) in period t+At realizing an after tax return of (l-T)W(t+4t) + TW(t); if Lt is sufficiently small there is no difference between taxation on an accrual basis and taxation on a realization basis.
Using Taylor series to evaluate the right hand side of (11) and discarding all terms of order (t)2 or greater we see that W(t)rt = W'(t)(1-T)T or,
This first order differential equation describes the evolution of W(t), the value of the tree. A boundary condition is that W(t) = X(ta) if the tree is cut dow-n at time t. Thus, the present discounted value of a tree taxed on an accrual basis at rate r which will be cut do-n at t Is just X(ta)e_(r/(l_T))ta. Clearly ta shauld be chosen to axIze this value.
2) That dt /dt < 0 follows iiinediately from the fact that so that R = y = r/(l-T), the discount rate used by private investors facing accrual taxation at rate T in the wine sector. This observation is of somewhat limited interest as r, not R, is the social rate of discount; it is not efficient to decide when to harvest wine by using the rate R as a discount rate. The present discounted value of a dollar of resources invested in wine is exp[rt T/(l-T)].
Proof:
Consider one dollar invested in wine which goes to produce wine harvested at ta and worth X(ta) at that time. Gross returns are clearly X(t)ea. Hower, in equilibrium the present discounted value of (r/(l_T))ta after tax returns is equal to one dollar so X(ta) = e Substituting, we find gross returns from one dollar are
Since gross returns are the sum of private returns and the present rta T/l-T discounted value of taxes paid this latter amount must be e -1 per dollar invested in wine.
We note that whether the total return from investments in wine are greater or less than returns in the ordinary sector depends on whether
Because ta is a function of T, the expression on the left hand side of (12) is quite complicated to analyze. We give examples in Appendix Il-A which
show that this expreion can be greater or less than 1, that it can be increasing or decreasing in I, and that its limit as i approaches 1 can be either 0 or .
Trees
The effects of accrual taxation on trees are also straightforward.
The analysis of Proposition 8 applies. A tree cut down after u years of growth yields an after-tax return with a present discounted value of V(u)e' T)• If planting a tree costs P, a plot of land on which trees are planted yields returns which are equivalent to the payment of V(u)e(T) -P Ut times 0, u, 2u
Thus the value of land is
L(u) = Vu,e
The optimal cutting time, U, is chosen to maximize the right hand side of (13). It is immediately clear from (13) that Ua is not, as in the realization case, independent of the rate of capital gains taxation. We du show in Proposition 10 that < 0. The optimal cutting time is, as analyzed above, U. If the rate of capital gains taxation is zero then U = Thus accrual taxation leads to trees being cut down too soon.
Proposition 10.
The optimal cutting time for trees which are taxed on an accrual basis is a decreasing function of the tax rate.
Proof:
By definition
Assuming an interior solution, the first order conditions imply 
Tnus.
• The right hand side of (17 ) attains a maximum over u r > 0 when u r 0.
-ru du a a At this point (ur + 1)e a -1 = 0. Thus, -< 0.
When we analyze the gross returns to investment in trees with accrual taxation, we get a result which is similar to Proposition 9.
Proposition 11:
If capital gains are taxed on an accrual basis at rate T, the gross return to one dollar invested in trees is exp (ruaT/(l_T)).
Proof: To see this, consider again an investment in a single tree. Land worth L(u ) is used for a period of u and resources worth P are used to a a -(r/(1-T)u plant the tree. These costs bring a private return of V(Ua) e a, Total returns from these costs are V(u) e a Thus the ratio of total returns to private returns, which is also in equilibrium the gross return to an investment of one dollar, is exp (ruaT/(1_T)).
The discussion following Proposition 9 applies here. Whether the rate of return to trees taxed on an accrual basis is greater or less than the rate of return in the ordinary sector depends on the nature of the function v( ). It is well known that as P increases to the point where L(Ua) = 0, Ua converges to ta; that Ua satisfies V'(Ua)/V(U) = r/(l-T). Thus, the examples of Appendix II.A demonstrate that (l_T)exp(rua'r/(l_T) can be increasing or decreasing in T and that lim (lT)exp(ruaT/(1_T)) can be T1 either 0 or .
II. Inflation A. The Ordinary Sector
We model inflation in the ordinary sector by assuming that a dollar invested yields a stream of gross returns y(s)e. The after tax rate of return, ', is now the solution to (18) 1 = f y(s)e(l -T)e'8ds.
If r is the after tax rate of return in the ordinary sector without inflation, it is straightforward to show that ' = r + r; r + r is the rate which investors will use to discount all future benefits.
If goverrnnent revenues are used efficiently a dollar of tax revenue collected at time s has a present discounted value equal to Thus, the present discounted value of taxes collected is again l-As in the case with no inflation, a dollar invested in the ordinary sector produces a total stream of returns with present discounted value equal to (l-T).
B. The Austrian Sectors
Our analysis of the effects of inSlaton on the Austrian sectors focuses on the two distortions examined earlier. Table 1 summarizes the effects of inflation on selling time and value of gross return for wine and trees under both accrual taxation and taxation on a realization basis.
The details of the derivation of the entries in Table 1 are tedious and are given in Appendix II . Here we surzaarize and explain the results. Under accrual taxation, the analysis of the effects of inflation is straightforward, but the effects themselves defy simple summary. About all that can be said is that inflation complicates --sometimes exacerbating and sometimes alleviating --the distortions induced by taxation. If the inflation rate is ri and the tax rate is T, wine taxed on an accrual basis is exactly the same as wine which is untaxed but discounted at a rate 1-T From (18) inflation can be modeled by assuming that the discount rate rises to r+n while the nominal value of wine sold at time t equals X(t)eflt. Thus, wine harvested at time t has a present discounted after tax value of
The selling time of wine, t, maximizes the expression above. This gives us the first order condition
The right hand side of this equation is increasing in fl. Thus, ta is decreasing in ri.
The calculation of the present discounted value of gross returns under inflation is similar to that of Proposition 9, only now the discount rate r+fl is substituted for r; the gross rate of return is exp [(r+fl) taT/(1_Tfli which, as examples in Appendix II.B show, can be increasing or decreasing in fl.
Trees are again more complicated than wine but the effects of inflation are cualitatively the same. The optimal cutting time Ua satisfies
This is similar to the expression in the case without inflation, (14) The first order condition which t* must satisfy is (21) (t*,T,n) = e_ r)t*{_rX(t*)eflt*(l_T) -nt*
-(rr+r)TB + X'(t*)e
(1-i)) 0 Let W*(T,fl) = W(t*(T,rl), T,fl). In equilibrium investments earn a competitive rate of return so that (22) B = B(T,rl) = W*(T,fl) = Max e_ +n)t{x(t)ent(l_T) + TB(T,r) }.
Rearranging, we find that
Applying the implicit function theorem to (21) we find that
At low rates of inflation increases in fl can increase or decrease selling time, depending on the evolution of x(•). if wine is sold at t*. The present discounted value of gross benefits generated by this dollar is X(t*)ert. Setting (25) equal to one and rearranging we find In contrast to the case of accrual taxation, these results fit into a simple pattern. Inflation, at least inflation at a rapid rate, reduces the distortions which a tax on realized capital gains induces. There is a straightfoard explanation. The distortions which this tax induces stem from the exclusion of the base value of the asset from the tax base.
Inflation reduces the value and the effect of this exclusion.
One entry in Table 1 does not fit this neat pattern. With no inflation trees taxed at realization are cut down at the socially optimal time. As 34 inflation increases, the cutting time of trees increases; inflation induces inefficiency. The proof of this fact is tedious and given in the appendix.
However, there is a simple intuitive explanation. Inflation and taxation interact to make it appear to the investor that planting costs have increased. The investor chooses u to maximize Let F(t) be the probability that the owner of wine lives until at least period t. Then F(0) = 1, F(°) = 0 and F(t) is decreasing. For Simplicity we assume F(t) is differentiable and let f(t) = F'(t). If the probability of death is constant then F(t) = e and f(t) = -ye'. Let be the rate of capital gains taxation at death. We consider two values of Td, Td Q corresponds to the present U.S. system which is known as atonatjc step up in basis or step up for short. Under step up, capital gains ta::es are avoided at death. as constructive realization. Under this system the estate is presumed to sell the asset at death and to pay tax at the ordinary capital gains rate on the gains which the sale realizes. Under constructive realization = T. We compare these two systems to the system analyzed in the last part which is referred to as a carryover system.
If an investor plans to sell an asset at t, the expected present discounted value of the after tax proceeds is (27) J(t) = e_rtF(t)(X(t)(l_T) +TB) -f e_rs(X(s)(l_Td) + TdB))f(s)ds.
The first term in (27) represents the discounted after tax value he will receive if he lives until t. The second term is the discounted after tax value which his estate will receive. This formula is not quite correct for two reasons. First, the pretax value the estate realizes will in general be more than X(t) since the value of the asset will exceed X(t). Determining exactly what this value is seems very difficult. Secondly, in contrast to the analysis of Section I above, B here is an arbitrary parameter. Although in principle B should satisfy a zero profit condition, it is hard to write down this condition for this model because investors'mortality functions will influence their profits. It is hard to figure out what should be the "market" mortality function. We think neither of these simplifications will affect our analysis.
The planned selling time t is chosen to maximize J(t); t satisfies (28) X'(t*) = r [1 Since f(t) ( 0, this follows immediately from (28).
Note that planned selling time is not the same as actual selling times. Under either step up or constructive realization an investor's heirs may plan to sell an asset at a different time than the original investor planned. This is because the heirs will have a different, higher basis which will cause them to plan to sell sooner than the original investor. They also will have a different mortality function which will, under step up also affect their planned selling time. It is easy to see from (27) that increases in either T or Td will decrease the value of an asset.
The effects of increases in T on planned selling time are more complicated. Since planned selling time is the same under constructive realizatio.n as under carryover, dt*/dT < 0 in both cases. Under step up dt*/dT can be either positive or negative. If B = 0, the selling time will be greater under step up then if there were no taxation so must be positive. f(t*)
On the other hand if B is positive and -j:t*) is very snail, will be f(t*) negative --as It is when = 0. For simplicity we have given the analysis only for the case of wine, a similar analysis for trees shows that u satisfies
Rate of flow of returns from investmei-its in the ordinary sector s years after the initial investment.
X(t)
Value of wine if consumed t years after it is laid down.
B
Base or initial value of investment in wine. V(u) Value of a tree if cut down u years after planting. Selling time which maximizes present discounted value of total returns to investments in wine.
u Cutting time which maximizes present discounted value of total returns to investment in trees.
Selling time which maximizes private after tax returns to investments in wine taxed on a realization basis.
Cutting time which maximizes present discounted value of after tax returns to investments in trees taxed on a realization basis. t Privately optimal selling time for wine taxed on an accrual basis. Privately optimal selling time for trees taxed on an accrual basis.
r After tax rate of return.
6
Ratio of planting costs to total costs of investments in trees.
T0
Rate of taxation in ordinary sector. In this section, we show that with wine taxed on a realization basis, at low rates of inflation an increase in ri can increase or decrease selling time. We give examples where is greater than, less than, and 
